Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva by Azeri, Siyaves
I I
STUDIES AND ARTICLES
STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Siyaves Azeri
HUME’S THEORY OF SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF
ABSTRACT
Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and 
the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he 
allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise 
but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume’s account 
of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the 
impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. 
Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of 
the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume’s account of the self 
anticipates social-historical theories of the self.
The Humean Riddle
Hume, in his Treatise, distinguishes two aspects of the self: “[P]ersonal iden-
tity, as it regards our thoughts or imagination…. and as it regards our passions 
or the concern we take about ourselves” (2006: 165).
Hume is usually criticized for accepting the existence of an idea of the 
self at the beginning of Book 2, whereas earlier he denies having any such 
idea. Conceptualization of identity, despite the fact that people are constantly 
changing, seems almost contradictory. According to Penelhum (2000), Hume’s 
account of personal identity is confusing because he “ascribes to the self (in 
Book 1) a tendency to confuse invariance and succession in telling us how we 
come to generate the fiction of continuing identity; such a story seems to as-
cribe a continuing reality to the mind in the very process of showing how the 
belief in it can come to exist where there are only successive perceptions to 
constitute it.” Penelhum maintains that the source of unattainability of a solu-
tion to Hume’s account of personal identity is Hume’s mistaken supposition 
that taking a succession of similar impressions to constitute the identity of 
a thing is contradictory (2000: 29-30). For instance, as is with the case of a 
musical theme made of successive notes, the theme is a single entity made of 
parts. However, there still remains the problem, which Penelhum apparently 
ignores: how do we attribute identity to the theme? How do we, at the first 
place, attribute identity to a note? Hume suggests that if an atomistic logic is 
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adopted, then we cannot attribute any identity to any entity. Penelhum seem-
ingly assumes the existence of a factor that is responsible for unity and iden-
tity of things, but he does not provide any account of it. He thus attributes 
to Hume the view that a thing remains identical to itself only if the thing re-
mains unchanged (2000: 30). However, Hume’s comparison of the state and 
human’s identity of the self, shows that he is aware that we do correctly attri-
bute identity to things despite the changes they undergo. His question is how 
do we do this? What is the source of idea of identity in general and idea of an 
enduring self in particular? 
Epistemologically, Hume shows that a number of questions cannot be re-
solved properly within the associationist framework. Causality and the idea 
of the self are among them.
The emergence of the idea of the self, on Hume’s account, is not a process 
of the socialization of an individual atomic self; human beings are social enti-
ties from the outset; they have to be differentiated and individuated as selves 
against a social background. The view that considers the negative epistemo-
logical account of the self in Book 1 and the social-passionate accounts of the 
self in Books 2 and 3 contradictory ignores this aspect: Hume’s account of epis-
temology is based on his account of society and history; epistemological and 
metaphysical questions are questions that belong to humans only and humans 
are social entities; they are concrete beings and not personifications of an ab-
stract human essence or substance. In this, Hume’s social model anticipates 
cultural-historical and socio-historical approaches to the concept of the self.
Hume, presumably, shows that a “pure” epistemological account of iden-
tity and many other epistemological problems is not attainable; but this does 
not exclude the possibility and desirability of a resolution of such problems 
socio-psychologically. Identity is conceptual, but this does not make it less 
real. If the social and psychological genesis of concepts and conceptual frame-
works is accounted for, then the real source of idea of identity is determined.
The idea of the self is caused by the passions; it is constituted socially via 
language and the exercise of sympathy. Hence, in the following, Hume’s social 
theory of constitution of the self will be reconstructed within the wider context 
of his general philosophy pertaining to his views on concept-formation (ideas), 
language, sympathy, and the passions. According to Hume, pride and humility 
are indirect passions and their object is one and the same: the self (2006: 182). 
Although pride and humility are possible only with regard to the self, and de-
spite the fact that the self is the object of these passions, it is not their cause. 
Pride and humility are passions that are located between two ideas. The first 
idea, which is the productive principle, causes pride and humility. The second 
idea is the self, which is the object of these passions and is produced by these 
passions (2006: 183). Hume enumerates a number of qualities as the causes of 
pride and humility, such as imagination, judgment, memory, etc., which are 
not confined to the mind, but also pertain to the body (2006: 183). The social 
nature of all these qualities is worth noticing; they are realizable and mean-
ingful in a community of shared beliefs, customs and value-judgments. Thus, 
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Hume includes country, family, children, relations, and property among such 
qualities (2006: 183). These passions and the related qualities are not mere ab-
stractions, but are related to us materially. For instance, speaking of beauty, 
Hume states: “Beauty, consider’d merely as such, unless placed upon something 
related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation 
alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on 
that passion” (2006: 183). Beauty is not conceivable unless it is a property of 
some object. This object has to be related to us where such relatedness requires 
that the object is in a world that is defined by beliefs, customs, habits, value 
judgments etc. Knowledge, even in its purest epistemological sense, is acquir-
able only within these social relations. Thus, differentiating between the so-
called “epistemological” and “instinctive” (“passionate”) selves seems artificial.
The notions of the “epistemological” and the “passionate” selves do not 
signify two distinct selves, but different continuous stages of a single self. For 
instance, when deducing the idea of causality through making an analogy with 
will power, and with reference to pure epistemological data based upon raw 
impressions of the individual person, Hume argues that our command over 
our mind has certain limits—we cannot claim total sovereignty over it. More-
over, it is not possible precisely to fix the boundaries of our authority—mean-
ing the boundaries of our individual selves—unless we consult experience: 
“In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of 
matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason 
beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than the ex-
ternal objects have” (2006: 108).
Hume argues that there is no absurdity in reflecting the principle of dis-
tinctness and separability of impressions onto external objects (2006: 398). 
However, the reflexive perception of one’s own self consists of one or more 
perceptions and what is perceived reflexively is but perceptions. The idea of 
the self signifies the reflexive consciousness of those perceptions:
We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. 
Suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to 
have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. 
Do you conceive anything but merely that perception? Have you any notion of 
self or substance? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you 
that notion. (2006: 399)
A more accurate account of the Humean theory of the self would be as fol-
lows: Hume rejects the essentialist account of identity. On the other hand, in 
Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise, he explicitly proposes the existence of an idea 
of the self which is not necessarily unchanging. Hume’s reference to the alter-
ability of the self in both space and time is strong evidence that he is working 
with the strange, paradoxical, and conflicting idea of a changing yet identical 
self. He dismisses the existence of a substantial self as the basis upon which 
the idea of an unchanging self is formed; however, he discovers and explains, 
in a rudimentary way, the idea of a socially constituted self. 
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Despite efforts to reconcile the seemingly contradictory conceptions of the 
self in the Treatise, many scholars seem to dismiss the question, concentrat-
ing on personal identity either as it regards thought, or as it regards passions. 
Jamie Ferreira (1994) focuses on the latter and dismisses the question of the 
metaphysical self, touching on the question only briefly, when she tries to de-
fine the imagination’s role with reference to sympathy. Similarly, Tony Pitson 
(1986) focuses upon Hume’s view concerning other selves as if it is a question 
in Cartesian tradition: “are the bodies that surround me mere bodies or do they 
have minds?” Pitson tries to relate the issue of other minds to the question of 
the content of perception in order to reconcile the two aspects of Hume’s con-
sideration of the self. Jane McIntyre (1989) tries to reconcile these two aspects 
by claiming that the principle of identity, which is discussed in Book 1, does not 
exhaust the question of personal identity. Donald Ainslie (1999), on the oth-
er hand, tries to overcome the tension by drawing a parallel between Hume’s 
“skeptical” account of objectivity and his view on the formation of belief with 
regard to other selves. Robert Anderson (1966) relates the above-mentioned 
tension to two Humean principles or premises: 1) “[w]hatever is conceivable 
is possible” and 2) “[w]hatever is different is separable by thought or by imag-
ination” (3). Conceivability requires clarity and distinctness, where this clarity 
and distinctness is supposed not to involve any contradiction. Since we have an 
idea of our self, we should assume that we have an impression of it, even if it 
is perceived at a time that we are not aware of. The presence of an impression 
of the self signifies the existence of the self as a distinct entity. Yet another in-
ference is possible: if we do not have an impression of the self, then the idea 
of our own self must be an illusion, a mere fiction because the lack of an im-
pression of the self signifies its non-existence. Eugenio Lecaldano (2002) ad-
dresses the problem of the relation between the epistemological and passionate 
selves and admits that, in recent Humean scholarship, the interpretation that 
these two notions are contradictory is no longer tenable (175). Nevertheless, in 
agreement with Baier and Purviance, he states that Hume abandons the notion 
of the self as a bundle of perceptions (Book 1 of the Treatise) and introduces a 
new notion of self (Book 2) (2002: 180). However, such a claim, instead of ad-
dressing the question that pertains to the relation between these two concep-
tualizations, aims at eliminating the question by giving up one of the notions. 
For Hume, the self is nothing but the bundle of perceptions meaning that 
the self has no reality over and beyond the series of perceiving acts. It is a bun-
dle of activities, but it does not require an already existing agent. The agen-
cy is constituted as the act is actualized. This is to say that the formation of 
the self as a consequence of perceptual acts is a process of the individuation 
of the human person, which at the outset is born into social surroundings. It 
is not the transporting of perception onto an internal realm but the building 
of the internal realm through and with the perceptual activity. It is a process 
of interiorization. Meaning that, there is no stage or place prior to act of per-
ception upon which the perceptions are located. Rather, the activity and the 
making of the self are one and the same. Penelhum is right in saying that the 
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making of the self or the constitution of personal identity is not a logical con-
struction (2000: 112). Yet, this does not mean that Hume simply dismisses the 
self or considers it a mere fiction. It may be said that Hume tries to show the 
impossibility of providing a satisfactory account of the self that is solely based 
on an empiricist, associationist epistemology. He resolves the riddle of the self 
with reference to passions, sentiments and to social processes. Thus, we do add 
something to “mind’s survey of the sequence of our perceptions that is not in 
the objects surveyed but has the mind’s survey of them as its source” (Penel-
hum 2000: 112), but this is not a consequence of associative mechanisms. As-
sociative mechanisms are unable to explain how the mind comes to perceive 
an individual perception as one particular perception, which will later resem-
ble another distinct but similar perception. In other words, associative epis-
temology cannot explain how the very first perception takes place so that the 
train of resembling perceptions begins. 
The Bundle of Perceptions
In the Treatise Hume introduces the idea that internal perceptions are not al-
ways simple but are often compound and complex (2006: 157). Hume relates 
self-identity to perceptions in general, i.e., the mind is supposed to be noth-
ing but a bundle of perceptions. There is no essence to the mind. Hume states, 
“mankind … [is] nothing [but] a bundle or a collection of different perceptions, 
which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpet-
ual flux and movement.” He also maintains that there is no impression from 
which the idea of the self is derived; hence there exists no idea of the self. Our 
existence depends upon our perceptions without which we may be said not 
to exist (2006: 165).
For Hume, the perceiving self is not a passive construction of random per-
ceptions and impressions. In the Appendix, he states: “[T]he annihilation, which 
some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this 
self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, 
pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same 
with self; since the one cannot survive the other” (2006: 399). There is no real 
constancy and identity of the self; rather, there is an ability or force, which 
must be involved, for the emergence of the idea. Imagination, by mistaking 
the resemblance between the successive perceptions for sameness, produces 
the idea of a substantial, identical self.
Imagination is not alone in creating such an idea; it works together with 
sympathy:
But this is still more remarkable, when we add a sympathy of parts to their 
common end, and suppose that they bear to each other, the reciprocal relation 
of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. This is the case with all 
animals and vegetables; where not only several parts have a reference to some 
general purpose, but also a mutual dependence on, and connexion with each 
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other. The effect of so strong a relation is, that tho’ every one must allow, that 
in a very few years both vegetables and animals endure a total change, yet we 
still attribute identity to them, while their form, size, and substance are entire-
ly altr’d. (2006: 68)1
The question, then, is whether the multitude of perceptions is really uni-
fied by the so-called identity of the mind, or these ideas are only associated by 
imagination to construct an identity. Hume goes on: “Identity is nothing really 
belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but mere-
ly a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in 
the imagination, when we reflect upon them” (2006: 169). This unity is based 
upon three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The most im-
portant ones are resemblance and causation. 
Hume explains the relationship between the sympathetic and epistemolog-
ical selves by emphasizing that the formation of impressions requires a val-
ue-laden ground that transcends the self:
Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always 
consider’d with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou’d never be able either 
to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of 
them. When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for 
pride or for humility. But tho’ that connected succession of perceptions, which 
we call self, be always the object of these two passions, ’tis impossible it can be 
their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. (2006: 182)
The nature of the self is changeable and inconstant. For Hume, every per-
ception is a different existence, and he admits that there is no perception of 
a real connection between these different existences. The self cannot confine 
itself to one passion only. As Hume states, “[h]uman nature is too inconstant 
to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it” (2006: 186). 
There is something that organizes the sequence of perceptions without which 
one is nothing and relates it to the perceptions of external objects. There is a 
parallel between the external object and the internal self. The apparent con-
stancy of the internal or the mental, i.e., the constancy of the self, is based 
upon the apparent constancy of the external goods and the perceptions one 
possesses of these external objects.2 We should note that other subjects too 
could be considered sources of the idea of stability. External subjects bring to-
gether perception and sympathy as the necessary basis for an idea of the self.3
1  See also 2006: 169.
2  Annette Baier (1979), states: “It is reasonable to expect that attention to external 
objects, to the heap of possessions of one possessor, will be needed before one can dis-
cern an enduring stable person in the continual revolutions of perceptions.”
3  Capaldi introduces the precognitive self as the unifying element that keeps the fluc-
tuating self together and refers to it as Hume’s great philosophical discovery. “The unity 
of consciousness as the preconceptual condition or content of conceptualization emerg-
es as a fundamental discovery in Hume” (1985: 278). 
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Another basic feature of the idea of the self is that it resembles itself. Even 
though it is in a state of perpetual flux, the idea of the self is associated with 
itself. This resemblance is based upon certain properties of human nature.4 
Resemblance and contiguity are necessary conditions for the existence of the 
self. Something which is not presented to us “has no manner of influence on 
our vanity” (2006: 198). The formative impact of the relationship between 
sense perception and the perceived object is a reciprocal one; each requires 
the existence of the other: “Ourself, independent of the perception of every 
other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to 
external objects; and it is natural for us to consider with most attention such 
objects as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us” (2006: 221).
The Passions and the Individuation of the Self
Hume states that “ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related 
to self must partake of that quality” (2006: 274). Intimacy is not one’s immedi-
ate access to one’s own self. Rather, it is the expression of the existence of the 
self in a particular space, namely concrete bodily existence, and a particular 
succession of moments, namely imagination. Hume then states: 
[T]he imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time, in which 
we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the pas-
sions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote 
objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. (2006: 274)
One’s access to the self, thus understood, is as mediated and external as 
one’s access to any object. Our concern about our self is the result of spatial 
contiguity that we have with our body, since “[c]ontiguous objects must have 
an influence much superior to the distant and remote” (2006: 274). This spa-
tial proximity to one’s own self adds to one’s idea of identity in time because, 
as mentioned above, distance in space is more influential in determining the 
vivacity of ideas of objects than distance in time. 
The idea of space is the expression of coexistence of certain parts in a cer-
tain order, whereas the idea of time consists in the succession of these parts 
so that not all of them are present to one’s senses simultaneously. This incom-
pleteness provokes the participation of the imagination when the identity of 
objects in time is at stake. Yet, imagination’s role in forming the idea of identity 
is not a fantastic one, but a consequence of the logical passing from a present 
idea to an idea in the future. So, the identity of the self in space and time is 
determined by the same rules that determine the relation between ideas and 
impressions in general, because “ourselves [are] existent in a point of time in-
terpos’d betwixt the present instance and the future object” (2006: 276).
We form the idea of ourselves based on the idea of others, through form-
ing the impressions of another’s self. As Hume states: “Every human creature 
4  For the explanation of these properties see 2006: 185–186.
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resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other ob-
ject, in operating on imagination” (2006: 232). The formation of ideas requires 
proximity and contiguity together with resemblance. The only place where 
these conditions can be fulfilled is in society, since there can be no such thing 
as an impression of my own self, independent of others. In order to form an 
idea of myself, I need the other to reflect the impressions resembling myself 
that result in the idea of my own self. As Hume puts it, “[i]n general we may 
remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because 
they reflect each others’ emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sen-
timents, and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay by insensible 
degrees” (2006: 236). The object of the perception of self can be another sub-
ject as well as one’s own self. One knows oneself through others.5 Sympathy, 
in this respect, is a lively idea that one has about the other’s self, which has 
been turned into an impression of the self (2006: 248).
A particular self is different from all others due to the fact that it represents 
a unique bundle of perceptions. The whole critical standpoint of the Humean 
notion of the self is based on the rejection of any type of essentialism.6 Hume’s 
answer to this question more or less resembles Locke’s consideration of the 
matter, where Locke addresses the question of the identity of man, whose 
identity consists in the preservation and continuance of the same life (1975: 
321-322). The non-substantialist consideration of the self may be named for-
mal-existential: the existence of a particular thing (be it an object or a person) 
requires the appearance of that thing in a certain form, so that it can be differ-
entiated from all other things. The uniqueness of the particular thing suffices to 
define the particularity of that thing from all others. As Capaldi puts it, “what 
Hume needs to be able to use in the accounts of the indirect passions and the 
mechanism of sympathy is primarily the idea of oneself as distinct from oth-
ers. This means that Hume has to take for granted that there is some answer 
to the problem of individuation” (1985: 87). It seems that Hume starts with 
other selves and that individuation happens only against such a background. 
Baier states that “In Book Two [Hume] seems to realize that the best pic-
ture of the human soul is the human body, so he can speak of ‘qualities of our 
mind and body, that is self’” (1991: 131). The notion of the body signifies the 
plural nature of the self. We cannot propose a satisfying answer to this ques-
tion if we insist on basing our notion of personal identity entirely upon a so-
lipsistic account. Such an account results in an irresolvable tension.7 The ques-
tion is as follows: Is there a possibility of forming a notion of the self if I am 
the only existing entity? Unless one presupposes the existence of a substantial 
self, one cannot claim that one has an impression, hence an idea of the self. It 
seems that to proceed from a bundle of perceptions towards the formation of 
the notion of the self is impossible. 
5  See also Capaldi 1985: 279. 
6  For a detailed discussion, see Capaldi 1975, chapter 7.
7  See Anderson 1996, chapters 4 and 9.
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Reflexive impressions or passions that raise sentiments precede the for-
mation of any judgment concerning oneself; they even precede the formation 
of the idea of the self. So, the line of reasoning that reduces the love for the 
other into a derivative of self-love proceeds in the wrong direction, since it is 
only through the reflexive impressions and passions that love is first exercised. 
One’s love always has to be directed towards “some sensible being external to” 
oneself (2006: 214). In other words, oneself, if taken by itself, is not a truly sen-
sible being but an abstraction only. The common mistake of most people is to 
consider the self and the other as simple binaries. In such an approach, either 
the “I” is reduced to the other, or the other is reduced to the “I”. However, in 
such a case, we cannot escape the vicious circle of the absolute dissolution of 
the self or of the other empathetically. One does not identify oneself with the 
other; rather he or she constitutes oneself in resemblance to the other; one acts 
as if the other’s perceptions were one’s own. 
In the section on virtue in Book 3 of the Treatise, Hume speaks of the in-
fluence of morals over actions and passions. Contrary to morals, reason has 
no such influence. Hume concludes, “the rules of morality are not conclusions 
of our reason” (2006: 294). Morality is active, whereas reason is inactive. The 
inactivity of reason means that it does not exert any power upon passions and 
actions. All shapes and appearances of reason share this inactivity (2006: 294).
Hume compares vice and virtue to sound, color, heat and cold, pointing 
that these latter qualities do not reside in the object but belong to the human 
mind. Like physical qualities that are not produced but only discovered by 
reason, moral qualities are not produced but are feelings that can only be dis-
tinguished. However, like the qualities attributed to objects, these feelings are 
sentiments that are felt by humans. Vice and virtue are objects of feeling and 
not objects of reason (2006: 301). This is more evidence for the priority of pas-
sions over sensation and reason. This priority, in turn, means that impressions 
of passion are actualizations of impressions of sensation and reason. Unless 
actualized, impressions of sensation are mere abstractions that are devoid of 
any concrete content and meaning. This is another way to explain the tension 
between reason and the passions, which according to Hume, is responsible 
for the diversification of a self with regard to others, and for the alterability of 
that self with regard to itself (2006: 280).
Impressions of Sensation and Impressions of Reflection
Hume divides impressions into original and secondary. This corresponds to an 
earlier division of impressions into “impressions of sensation” and “impres-
sions of reflection”. The former arise directly from perception, whereas the 
latter proceeds from the former. All impressions of the senses belong to the 
former; all passions and emotions belong to the latter. Yet, in the final anal-
ysis, all impressions are impressions of passion, even those impressions that 
Hume calls impressions of sensation or direct impressions. This means that 
even the purest epistemological activities of the human mind are determined 
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by humanity’s social being. For instance, when it comes to the ideas of cause 
and effect, Hume rejects the view that these ideas are perceptible per se. To the 
contrary, he introduces experience as particular human experience, and as that 
factor that makes the understanding of the ideas of cause and effect possible:
’Tis only from experience and observation of [the] constant union [of different 
objects], that we are able to form this inference [that causality exists]; and even 
after all, the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination. 
We must not here be content with saying, that the idea of cause and effect arises 
from objects constantly united; but must affirm, that ’tis the very same with the 
idea of these objects, and that the necessary connexion is not discover’d by a con-
clusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind. (2006: 261)
Hume maintains that human nature is insufficient by itself, not only for 
physical survival but also for the actualization of human skills and abilities. 
Without society, human nature would fail to provide the lively sensations and 
passions that agitate the spirit. Others communicate their actions and ideas to 
us and in this way these ideas participate in producing passions that belong to 
one’s own. An idea of a passion is more agreeable than any other idea “because 
such an idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation 
to the mind, than any other image or conception” (2006: 228). Passions that 
are agitated by others, and actions that have become habitual due to continual 
acquaintance and repetition, strengthen the conception of any object. Hume 
further explains the active role of human interaction by reference to the role 
of education (2006: 229). This also shows the social aspect of Hume’s concep-
tualization of the notion of the self, which is the object of passions.
In the section “of malice and envy” of the Treatise, Hume maintains that 
human impressions and ideas are not mere epistemological abstractions. He 
asks the question: how similar impressions and ideas can result into the rise of 
different judgments concerning the same object? (2006: 240) He is aware that 
the relation between impressions and objects of impressions, or to put it more 
clearly, the relation between perceiver and the perceived, is not a simple me-
chanical reflection of an object upon the mind. Hume admits that the variation 
of judgments should in principle be caused by some variation in impressions, 
but the variation of impressions is caused by the variation in reflexive impres-
sions that accompany every impression and idea. In other words, impressions of 
perception are subordinate to impressions of reflection. Hume states, “no object 
is presented to the senses, nor image form’d in the fancy, but what is accompa-
ny’d with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion’d to it” (2006: 240).
A (Probable) Humean Theory of Language 
Paul Árdal (1977) criticizes Hume’s so-called official view to the effect that the 
meaning of words is a mental image. (Cowley (1968) interprets Hume’s view 
of language along these same lines.) A consideration of Hume’s rudimentary 
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account of language will show that the depiction of Humean philosophy as a 
kind of individualist atomism is not plausible. In the chapter of the Treatise, 
‘Of Abstract Ideas,’ Hume clearly rejects the view that meanings or words are 
private mental images (Árdal 1977: 53-54). 
Even though Hume maintains that ideas are images of impressions, and that 
there are ideas that are images of other ideas, we should note that the word 
“image,” as used by Hume, does not necessarily signify eidetic entities. That 
ideas are images of impressions is more likely to mean that they are reflections 
of, and derived from, impressions. As Hume writes, 
[T]he principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with 
another limitation, viz. that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we 
can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from 
this very reasoning concerning them. This is not, properly speaking, an excep-
tion to the rules so much as an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of 
themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are suppos’d to be deriv’d from 
impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed, either me-
diately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions. (2006: 10) 8 
The expression “image,” as it is used here, designates the priority of im-
pressions over ideas. 
For Hume the correspondence between simple impressions and ideas shows 
that they depend on one another. “Such a constant conjunction [between im-
pressions and ideas], can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a depen-
dence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions” (2006: 
9). This adds to the evidence that, for Hume, perceiving is not a passive pro-
cess where objects influence the mind. Rather, the mind plays an almost equal 
role in perceiving the objects, by forming impressions and ideas of the object 
of perception. The causal connection, which the human mind draws between 
impressions and ideas, is based on the empirical awareness of the precedence 
of the former over the latter. However, it is not reason that produces the rela-
tion of cause and effect between objects. Hume argues that although reason is 
aided by past experience and continuous conjunction of objects, passing from 
one object to the belief about the existence of another is not determined by 
reason. Rather, different objects are united in the imagination so that causal-
ity “depends solely on the union of ideas” (2006: 64). This is to say that, it is 
participation of the mind via imagination that gives rise to the idea of cause 
and effect. Hume maintains that causation, as the basis of reasoning, is not a 
philosophical relation but a natural one (2006: 65); in other words, the idea of 
causation is rooted in human nature. Similarly, in the section “Of the Causes of 
Belief” Hume makes the social basis of the formation of the idea of cause and 
8  Hume goes on to say that “We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of ex-
tension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are 
conveyed by our senses… Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find 
that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, 
from which they are derived, and which they represent.” (2006: 10)
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effect even clearer, by claiming that belief adds a structural strength to, and 
enlivens, ideas. Belief changes the form of conceiving of ideas; and it does so 
with the aid of custom or habit. Belief is founded on a present impression that 
will become a custom through repetition. Therefore, every belief is rooted in 
custom. Thus, belief is described as a more vivid and intense conception of an 
idea, which proceeds from relation to a present impression (2006: 71). Belief, 
in this sense, is reflexive, since it is an enlivened and enforced idea, and ideas 
belong to the mind. The whole process of conceiving not only impressions but 
also notions and ideas is also of a reflexive character. Custom and habit operate 
upon imagination and other faculties whenever conception and apprehension 
takes place. Martin Bell (2005) states that, although Hume seemingly aims at 
founding all knowledge on experience, he is aware that experience as such is 
not sufficient to account for empirical beliefs. As Hume remarks: “Objects have 
no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but cus-
tom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the 
appearance of one to the existence of another” (2006: 72). Yet, Hume admits 
the precedence of objects of perception over formation of ideas, since it is al-
ways the impressions that appear first and then ideas (2006: 9). 
Hume argues that “general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed 
to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes 
them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them” (2006: 
17). In this Hume attributes a regulating role to language; i.e., language is de-
picted here as a tool that facilitates discovering regularities and generalizations 
in the world and communicate them to others. Hume’s “instrumental” formu-
lation of language conceptualizes language as an auxiliary symbolic system that 
facilitates manipulation of the external world and the subject’s own behaviour. 
Moreover, Hume’s differentiation between ideas and words can be interpret-
ed as an initial effort to depart from a “naturalist” stance that reduces knowl-
edge and action to immediate responses to stimuli and conditioned reflexes. 
Language is an apparatus of socialization and humanization. Hume (1998) 
introduces justice and language as rooted in human convention. By “conven-
tion” Hume means “a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels 
in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in 
concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends 
to public utility” (Hume 1998: 172). Language is supposed to be a tool – a “gen-
eral plan or system” (1998: 72) – that functions for the utility of society. In this, 
the larger structure should not be ignored; “every man, in embracing that vir-
tue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system” (1998: 72). Hume gives the 
examples of system of exchange and speech and words and language as activ-
ities that are organized through human convention:
Thus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common in-
terest, without any promise or contact: thus gold and silver are made the mea-
sures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed by human 
convention and agreement. (1998: 172)
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 523
This linguistic model signifies a structure – a shared world – that is the 
historical consequence of particular linguistic acts performed by individual 
participants. This structure is not only the genetic result of such actions, but 
is also the common ground upon which new linguistic acts can be performed 
and against which they can be verified. Moreover, the resulted structure is not 
a purely formal architectonic, but an open-ended totality that functions with 
reference to public criteria and social utility.
In a letter to Joseph Spence (1932) Hume argues the case for the forming 
of ideas that are not directly rooted in sensory impressions. Hume’s position 
suggests a linguistic mediation that makes formation and association of ideas 
possible. Hume speaks of Mr. Blacklock, a blind poet (1932: 200). In answer to 
Hume’s question whether he has an idea of light or colors, Blacklock says that 
in his reading of numerous books and poems, and in many conversations, he 
has met so often with terms expressing colors that he has formed some “false 
associations” of an intellectual kind. Hume, thus, makes a link between lin-
guistic abilities, verbal thinking, and the formation of meaning and ideas: “I 
believe, in much of our thinking, there will be found some species of associa-
tion. It is certain we always think in some language, viz. in that which is most 
familiar to us; and it is but too frequent to substitute words instead of ideas” 
(1932: 201). Thus, thinking, for Hume, does not require having non-verbal im-
ages. The limit of thinking is not set by the limits of imagination. Moreover, it 
indicates that Hume assumes a regulative function for language when it comes 
to thinking and the formation of ideas.
Hume states that every idea is annexed to a word that in turn produces the 
idea upon utterance. Once the word is uttered it is impossible for the mind to 
prevent the emergence of the idea annexed to that word. Moreover, the rela-
tion between the idea and the word is not one of remembering a past experi-
ence, or a simple association of a symbol with former experiences, but is one 
of signification actualized by the mind through imagination to produce the 
corresponding idea (2006: 65).
Apparently, Hume is aware that the relation between the word and the 
idea or the entity it denotes is initially contingent and conventional; howev-
er, it turns into a necessary relation so that the word, once uttered, as Hume 
notes, immediately picks out the particular idea or entity it has been annexed 
to. The meaning of the term is fixed only with the participation of imagina-
tion. Imagination in this regard functions as the mechanism that is responsi-
ble for the formation of concepts, the essence of which is the unity of word 
and meaning. 
In the section “Of Abstract Ideas” Hume discusses the nature of general 
and abstract ideas and concludes that the common view, which attributes a 
general form of existence to abstract ideas, is erroneous. Abstract ideas, like 
any others, are particular and are finite in number. Thus the question arises, 
how are such particular and finite ideas general in their representations? Cus-
tom is responsible for such a general functioning (2006: 21). Moreover, when 
discussing the difficulties of attributing a general form of existence to abstract 
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ideas, Hume emphasizes the symbolic/semiotic nature of such ideas. Consid-
ering the idea of the self as a non-substantial concept, or to be more precise 
as an abstract idea, we can thus infer that the Humean notion of the self refers 
to some semiotic-ideational entity. Hume, furthermore, underlines the soci-
etal aspect of such a semiotic nature when refers to the habitual constitution 
of such a symbolic order. Hume states, 
[W]e have several instances of habits, which may be revived by one single word; 
as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a discourse, or any number of 
verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at a loss to recol-
lect, by the single word or expression, with which they begin. (2006: 20)
Hume asserts a close link between the progress of thought and language; he 
also supposes ideas, abstract or particular, to be those elements that thought 
and imagination use for their development. Consequently, Hume’s supposed 
system of language is a semiotic one that consists of signs signifying abstract 
and general ideas that are formed in the realm of impressions of passion. Lan-
guage not only serves to communicate ideas, but due to its symbolic structure, 
serves the association of ideas and impressions. As far as the idea of the self is 
concerned, language assists the sympathetic communicating of ideas and im-
pressions that are constituent elements of such an idea (See 2006: 21). 
The Function of Sympathy
According to Hume, sympathy is a feeling we have for those that are similar 
to us. Sympathy involves entering into the sentiments of others. Therefore we 
sympathize with those that most resemble us, physically and intellectually. In 
this sense, sympathy presupposes the existence of the “I” and of others as em-
bodied, intellectual beings that are capable of communicating and conveying 
their sentiments to each other and understanding one another’s states.
David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart (2004) argue that Humean sympathy is 
similar to empathy. They base this on Hume’s claim that self-love is one of the 
sources of sympathy. However, empathetic feeling is only one of the moments 
of sympathy. Sympathy is not only rooted in the passions of pride and humil-
ity, but in the opinion of others. What is at stake is not only my own self, as 
I perceive it internally, but my name as perceived by others. Hume explicit-
ly states that “[o]ur reputation, our character, our name are considerations of 
vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty 
and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and senti-
ments of others” (2006: 206). Sympathy is not a one-way street from one’s self 
to the other. Through sympathy the “I” acquires the sentiments of the other 
as moments of the constitution of itself. The ideas that are raised due to sym-
pathy, and which are converted to impressions gain such a degree of vivacity 
and force that they can replace the original passions themselves and produce 
affections equal to the original emotions. 
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Hume explains the intensity of sympathetic sentiments as a function of 
familiarity acquired by habit. The subjectivity of others is necessary for my 
subjectivity. Hume states that “[t]he stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves 
and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and 
convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always 
form the idea of our own person” (2006: 207). The more I am exposed to the 
sentiments of others, the more likely it is that I will be affected by their par-
ticular ideas and passions; thus the more likely I will constitute an idea of my 
own self in the image of others. 
Familiarity and habit indicate that the other does not signify a conceptu-
al abstraction but an empirically existing human subject. Hence, the other’s 
opinions and judgments become important to me along with the degree of the 
importance that I ascribe to them. Thus Hume writes that “[t]he judgment of 
a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is 
only inferior in its influence on our own judgment” (2006: 209).
Susan James’ interpretation of the origin of Humean notion of sympathy 
bases it on the experience of gravity, which in turn affects the imagination 
(2004: 115–118). In this way, she suggests a naturalist formulation concerning 
the emergence of the moral and value judgments in Hume. However, she ig-
nores the distinction that Hume draws between objects of one’s perception and 
other selves as one perceives them.9 Hume does not treat the force of gravity (or 
any other natural phenomenon) in this way. Moreover, attributing such values 
to natural and cultural objects, e.g., to mountains or building blocks, happens 
only after such values have already emerged as the consequence of sympathet-
ic interaction between human selves. Therefore, the effect of the experience 
of gravity on the imagination is not qualitatively different than the effect pro-
duced, for example, by the perception of a huge building; to the extent that 
their axiological effects are concerned, both influence the mind figuratively 
and metaphorically and both are byproducts of feelings of pride and humility.10 
Hume’s considering of the influence of imagination on the passions pro-
vides further evidence regarding the social determination of passions, impres-
sions, and the human subject. Human beings do not choose different actions 
due to general, abstract maxims. Rather, they make decisions in accordance 
with their forms of life. Hume states that “[a] pleasure, which is suitable to 
the way of life, in which we are engag’d, excites more our desires and appe-
tites than another, which is foreign to it” (2006: 273). Appetites, desires, and 
intentions are not set once and for all. They change due to human beings’ life 
activity. As Hume states:
9  James notices that “the admiration of other people reinforces our pride while their 
contempt undermines it, we cannot single-handedly sustain the feeling we have about 
our own condition and depend on the opinion of others to augment or diminish them” 
(2004: 114).
10  It is true, as James maintains, that Hume intends to provide a scientific account of 
human nature (2004: 107). However, such a scientific account does not have to be of a 
mechanical-Cartesian character. 
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We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such an-
other odious; but ’till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these 
ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections… 
The bare opinion of another, especially when inforc’d with passion, will cause 
an idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise 
have been entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or 
communication; and sympathy, as I have already observ’d, is nothing but the 
conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination. (2006: 273)
The idea of the self is not based on impressions of sensation. Rather it is 
based on an impression of reflection; the factuality of the self follows from the 
sympathetically formed idea of the self.
Sympathy is a function, the content of which is material; i.e., it is deter-
mined by the material conditions of life, namely human activity, arts, industry 
etc. For instance, while discussing the scope of certain rights and the idea of 
justice, Hume attributes beneficence, humanity, friendship, gratitude, natural 
affection, and public spirit and tender sympathy to human nature (1998: 79). 
Similarly, in his first Enquiry (1999) he defines human beings as “reasonable,” 
“sociable,” and “active” beings, who have to submit to business and occupa-
tion (1999: 89). Hume rejects the Hobbesian idea of a natural state of war of all 
against all (1998: 87, n.11), because “Men are necessarily born in a family-soci-
ety” (1998: 88). Hume discusses a thought experiment: suppose humans con-
front rational, but weaker beings, both in bodily and mental terms; dogs, for 
example. He concludes that the resulting intercourse between the two cannot 
be called society, as the latter supposes a degree of equality. Rather, it would 
be a relation of absolute command and servitude. So it would be natural that 
these rational but lesser beings would be deprived of the right to property. The 
difference between human nature and that of this inferior animal species pre-
vents the full functioning of sympathy (1999: 107).
For Hume, when more advanced communities confront less advanced ones, 
a similar “temptation” to consider their members “lesser beings” is at work, 
leading the members of the former to consider themselves superior to the lat-
ter. He maintains that this is also the situation, in many nations, regarding the 
female sex and thus females are deprived – perhaps unjustly – from certain 
rights. Yet the similarity of their make-up as human persons eventually gives 
way to the growth of the idea of justice, so as to embrace them too. This hap-
pens, however, only as the consequence of material production, art, industry 
and the intercourse between humans and human communities, which com-
pose and determine sympathy:
[S]everal distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience 
and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the 
largeness of men’s views, and the force of their mutual connections. History, 
experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sen-
timents, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion 
as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue. (1998: 89)
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In his essay “Of National Characters” Hume (1985) sets out to explain the 
affinities among members of the same community. He rejects outright any role 
to air and climate, and emphasizes that human social activity is the only fac-
tor in determining national character. In animals the common characteristics 
may be attributed to biological and geographical dynamics. However, when 
humans are at stake, it is human activity and sympathy, political and social as-
semblage, and common language that is responsible for such sameness. It also 
makes the nature of sympathy as a function clearer.
The Human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of 
men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, 
and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity 
to company and society is so strong in all rational creatures; and the same dis-
position, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each oth-
er’s sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by 
contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of 
men are united into one political body, the occasion of their intercourse must 
be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the 
same speech or language, they must require a resemblance in their manners, 
and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar 
to each individual. (Hume 1985: 202-203)11
Hume presents the idea of the freedom and necessity of human actions in 
an analogy with rules that govern the movements of material bodies. In order 
to explain the uniformity and cohesion of human action, he explicitly refers 
to civil society and the social nature of human existence:
We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from 
natural and necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explain-
ing them: And for a like reason we must allow, that human society is founded 
on like principles; and our reason in the latter case, is better than even that 
in former; because we not only observe, that men always seek society, but 
can also explain the principles, on which this universal propensity is found-
ed. (2006: 258)
Hume is aware that particular human activities differentiate humans in their 
manners, behaviors and, in a general sense, their perceptions. Thus he writes: 
“The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those 
of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners” (2006: 259). 
It is the process of interiorization of these external determinations that iden-
tify human beings as members of society who belong to different ranks and 
classes. This process follows certain universal regulations and is applicable to 
all humans in a similar way. Thus Hume states that “[m]en cannot live with-
out society, and cannot be associated without government” (2006: 259). Yet, 
the determining factor that guarantees uniformity of human life is external 
11  Hume furthers this line of the reasoning as to include the difference between ani-
mals: “Even the difference of animals, he adds, depends not on climate” (1985: 202, n. 4).
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to individual agent’s mind; this factor is the totality of human activity that is 
governed and regulated by the state: 
Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks 
of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suites, war, leagues, 
alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and 
objects, which cause a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an unifor-
mity in human life. (2006: 259)
Human beings become aware of one another’s passions and sentiments by 
sympathy. They are social animals. Without others there could be no enjoy-
ment. With the aid of imagination, we produce ideas resembling impressions 
of others’ and partake in their pleasure and satisfaction. This is possible be-
cause our minds “are mirrors to one another” (2006: 236).
The Texture of the Self
Hume’s idea of substance anticipates his rejection of the idea of substantial 
self. Hume asks whether the idea of substance is an idea of sensation or reflec-
tion. He reasons that if it is an idea of an impression, then it should be a col-
or, a taste, an odor, or a sound etc. However, it seems obvious that substance 
is neither of the aforementioned. Thus he concludes “the idea of substance 
must therefore be deriv’d from an impression of reflection, if it really exists” 
(2006: 16). Since impressions of reflection are resolvable to passions and emo-
tions there can be no immediate and purely perceptual representation of any 
substance. Thus, Hume concludes, the idea of substance is nothing but a col-
lection of particular qualities.
Although the idea of substance does not correspond to an existing thing, it 
signifies something real as the representation of a collection of qualities. More-
over, Hume provides the basis for answering the question how atomic impres-
sions or sensations are to be related: the association of impressions and ideas 
are possible only based on impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation 
are only resolvable to atomic perceptions. The idea of a totality, such as an idea 
of a particular object, that makes associating of particular sensations into an 
idea of that particular object possible, emerges only in realm of impressions 
of reflection. In this sense, all impressions are derived from impressions of re-
flection. Thus, Hume states, “The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, 
is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, 
and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, ei-
ther to ourselves or others, that collection” (2006: 16). 
Hume rejects the idea of the self as a purely epistemological entity that 
is based on impressions of sensation. However, the self as a product of pas-
sions and sentiments, and as a moral agent, is affirmed. For Hume, the self is 
the product of passions of pride and humility, and the moral existence of the 
self is reinforced by sentiments through sympathy. Epistemologically, Hume 
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distinguishes between understanding, imagination, and the passions. Howev-
er, these faculties are conjoined in the science of human nature which Hume 
intends to construct. It is important to distinguish between different levels of 
abstraction where Hume addresses a particular issue. For instance, the rejec-
tion of the idea of an epistemologically constructed self is not in tension with 
admitting the existence of the self as a product of the genetic processes rooted 
in the social and moral environment. What Hume rejects is the possibility of 
an associative construction of the idea of the self out of raw, distinct, atomic 
sense-data. There is no substantial and qualitative difference between percep-
tually acquired impressions that enable us to conclude that the idea of the self 
refers to such impressions. Therefore, the existence of the self must be rooted 
elsewhere. The empirical fact of, say, Hume’s own standpoint that criticizes the 
idea of a pure epistemological self signifies the existence of a totality, which in 
this particular case designates Hume’s personal self. The existence of the idea 
of the self is already affirmed through the negation of the idea of the self via 
a particular self (in this particular case, via David Hume’s self). The existence 
of an empirical (social and moral) interpretive self is a necessary condition if 
any meaningful criticism of the idea of the self is to be realized. Hence, Amelie 
Rorty’s (1993) characterization of Hume’s philosophical project in the Treatise 
as a “British proto-version of The Phenomenology of Spirit”.
Hume’s non-Cartesian dualism also helps us to appreciate his rejection of 
the idea of a substantial self. The incorporeality that he attributes to mind does 
not denote the mind as a different substance but signifies the “ideal” texture 
of its composition. This “ideality” signifies the unity of thinking and bodily 
activity of human as the psycho-physical unity.
In the essay, “On the Immortality of the Soul,” Hume argues that what is 
designated by the term “soul,”—that is, consciousness and memory—definitely 
undergoes change. The mind, with the body, is generated, degenerated, cor-
rupted, and eventually vanishes into nothingness (1985: 591–592).
In order to justify his argument Hume makes a number of assertions: First, 
substance, be it material or ideal, is a composition of different qualities, i.e., 
it is a name that signifies a particular totality of a number of qualities. Hume 
accentuates this line of reasoning in the Appendix of the Treatise stating, “Phi-
losophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, that we have no idea of ex-
ternal substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities. This must pave 
the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, that we have no notion of 
it, distinct from the particular perceptions” (2006: 400). That is, the mind or 
soul just is a composition of ideal properties. Moreover, this composite mind 
or soul is closely related to the individual body. Both are subject to change. 
By analogical reasoning, therefore, the soul is not immortal. It changes and 
vanishes just as the body dies, and as the person ceases to be. The alleged in-
dependence from activity (perception) attributed to the idea of the self, thus, 
is just an abstraction of mind, just as the idea of substance independent from 
determinate qualities is such an abstraction.
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The immateriality of the soul follows from the impossibility of reducing 
mind or consciousness to a simple substance. This form of immateriality can 
only be conceived in terms of action and activity. It is the social composition of 
the human species that determines the degree of development of consciousness. 
Hume considers mind (soul) and body neither identical nor contradictory. In 
this, he comes close to monism holding that body vs. mind or body vs. think-
ing is a fallacious abstraction. It is the human body itself that thinks. Thinking 
is always an action performed by a natural and so by a spatially determined 
body. It follows that it is an action expressed/realized spatially. 
Hume’s account of the mind is a response to both substantialist and phys-
iological approaches. The soul cannot be reduced to the sum of physiological 
or mechanical bodily movements. There is a correspondence between certain 
bodily states and consciousness. However, the two are not identical, since con-
sciousness is not physical in its texture.12 
There is no substance to the mind; there is no substratum that holds the 
perceptions together. Rather, the mind is a system the content of which is de-
termined by the passions.13 The passions are not mere reactions to external 
forces. They are the primary source of action. The idea of the self vis-à-vis 
the passions is therefore real and expandable so that it determines the idea 
of the self with regard to thought and imagination. Passions are determined 
socially and so are their outcomes. Moreover, there is no opposition between 
the passions and reason; on the contrary, the two are complementary and rea-
son is limited by the sentiments and therefore it is determined socially and in 
praxis. As Rorty puts it, “unless [reason] is supported by sentiment, habit and 
custom, [it] can only provide a criterion to determine the propriety of the in-
tentions of the will: it is too general to command specific actions, indeed too 
general to provide specific intentions” (1993: 179). Reason discovers the idea 
of the self, as is with the case of reason discovering the relation between ideas 
(2006: 295-296). So, the existence of the self with respect to thought and imag-
ination is constituted. The existence of the epistemological self is not based 
upon immediate, atomic impressions. The idea of the epistemological self is 
not rooted in the formality, vivacity, and immediacy of impressions but is an 
abstraction based on the idea of a passionately constructed self that is contin-
ually enforced via sentiments and through sympathy.
Conclusion: The Paradox of the Self, the Intimate Externality
Hume’s theory of the self can be considered a prototype of a historical-ge-
netic approach that defines the self as an “ideal”. The non-substantiality of 
the Humean self designates not the unreality of its being but this distinguish-
ing texture. As an ideal, the self is not only a part of reality but reflects and 
12  This conclusion is also found in the Appendix. See the quote above in section 1 of 
this paper, 2006: 399.
13  See 2006: 414.
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 531
refracts reality by assuming a unique position in it. By definition, the self has 
a meaning that signifies something other than itself with the use of signs. The 
system of signs the self uses as a mean of signifying the real is basically ver-
bal and linguistic. 
Traditionally, philosophy locates mental phenomena in consciousness; by 
committing the same error of localizing mental phenomena in consciousness, 
and studying the latter in isolation from the real conditions of their being, both 
idealism and empirical psychologism reduce the study of the self to the study 
of isolated consciousness and its laws. In this way, they treat consciousness ei-
ther as transcendental or as an amalgamation of empirical data. In the former 
case, consciousness appears everything; in the latter, it amounts to nothing.
We can interpret Hume’s rejection of substantial being of the self as a first 
formulation of the process of the formation and emergence of the idea of ide-
ational self or the reflexive consciousness. Hume’s treatment of the self in 
Books 2 and 3 of the Treatise hints towards a possible solution of the question 
concerning the self as a social and objective, but non-substantial phenomenon.
Consciousness requires an objective and real medium for actualization and 
the word (language) provides consciousness with that reality. Therefore the 
problem of consciousness appears as the question concerning the inner word.
When setting up the psyche or human consciousness as an object and as 
a part of external reality, the question arises how to define the inner experi-
ence in external, objective terms. The basis of the answer is that the reality of 
the psyche, the inner experience, is the reality of the sign and human activity. 
The psyche is not reducible to physiological and nervous processes. The sub-
ject, the consciousness or the psyche, resides in the borderline area that sep-
arates the organism from its surrounding world. This is the paradoxical mode 
of the existence of the self which is also designated by the Humean notion of 
the self: the internality of the self or consciousness is based upon external re-
ality. Although there is no immanent substance of the self, and although the 
self is totally based on external reality and experience, there is, nonetheless, 
a sense of intimate access to the self. In fact, there is a self, even though not 
internally and intimately founded, that is internally and intimately accessi-
ble. The riddle of the self that is put forward by Hume can be interpreted as a 
variation of this problem.
The connecting point between the self of Book 1 and the self of Books 2 and 
3 is the paradoxical structure of the self as an entity that is constituted exter-
nally but is accessible to the person intimately. The negative position of Book 1 
aims at rejecting the notion of the self as a substantial being prior to any action 
or activity. Meanwhile, this negative conclusion signifies a positive resolution 
of the matter put forward in Books 2 and 3. The self, by its constitution, does 
not need an internally and inherently existing core or substratum; the self is 
rooted elsewhere, that is, in the external world, in our social surroundings. In 
the absence of such an environment, the idea of the self cannot be conceived 
through associating ideas in the abstract. This is not due to some shortcoming 
in the cognitive faculties of the agent of perception, but to a particular kind 
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of sense-perception that is required for the constitution of the idea of the self. 
Such impressions cannot be achieved at the highly abstract and formal level of 
epistemology as Hume indicates it in Book 1 of the Treatise. Unless both the 
difference and interconnection between these two realms is admitted, and the 
social-moral constitution of the self is properly considered, the resolution of 
the Humean riddle seems impossible. 
The concluding remarks of Book 2, part 3, section 8 of Hume’s Treatise not 
only show that all impressions are reducible to impressions of reflection, and 
that the passionate self is also the basis of the so-called epistemological self, 
but also provide a condensed explanation of the formation of sympathetic self 
and its differentiation from itself and from others in time and in space. Hume 
clearly explains that both passions and reason are affections of the mind; the 
former is a violent passion and the latter a calm one. We had formerly been 
said that passions yield the idea of the self, and, that the causes of passions, 
being different from their object – the self – are variable. Notwithstanding the 
fact that difference between calm and violent passions is a difference of degree 
rather than a difference of quality, these passions can change into one anoth-
er. The tension between reason and passion explains the diversity of human 
selves as well as the diverse nature of one particular self. Hume states: “Upon 
the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call’d, diversifies hu-
man life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from 
themselves in different times” (2006: 280). 
Thus, the fictitiousness of the idea of the self with regard to thought and 
imagination, in contrast to the factuality of the idea of the self with regard to 
passions, is a reflection of the aforementioned tension between calm and vio-
lent passions that results in differentiation of human beings with regard to each 
other and themselves. Moreover, this tension and diversification represent the 
paradoxical being of the self as something subject to great and small revolu-
tions, yet supposed to have spatio-temporal identity. Unless the objectivity of 
the self is admitted, the paradoxical existence of the self cannot be conceived 
and the tension between the epistemological and passionate selves will not 
disappear. Since the self is external to itself, it is subject to the same logical 
rules that direct the passing from one idea to another, regardless of how close 
or distant in time and in space these ideas might be. It is through this passage 
that the identity of the self in space and time is attained. These diverse and 
numerous ideas that are caused by calm and violent passions can be related to 
each other as elements of an unfinalized whole to assume an identity called 
“the self”. Therefore, what guarantees the identity of the self and makes intel-
ligible the idea of the self, is the paradoxical mode of the existence of the self 
as something objective, yet apprehended as if intimately.
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Sijaveš Azeri
Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva
Apstrakt
Hjum razlikuje sopstvo misli i uobrazilje i sopstvo strasti. Kritikuje se jer protivreči sebi zbog 
toga što navodno pripisuje fiktivnost sopstvu u prvoj knjizi Rasprave, a kasnije ponovo uvodi 
sopstvo u drugoj i trećoj knjizi. Hjumovo razmatranje ideje sopstva, međutim, nije protivreč-
no: on pokazuje nemogućnost čisto asocijaciono-empirističkog razmatranja sopstva. Umesto 
toga, predlaže društveno razmatranje konstitucije ideje sopstva i svesti. Čineći to, Hjumovo 
razmatranje sopstva anticipira društveno-istorijske teorije sopstva.
Ključne reči: Hjum, svest, sopstvo, subjektivnost
